The Impossibility of Metaphysical Closure
The Impossibility of Metaphysical Closure: Ontic and Epistemic Limits on Complete Metaphysical Systems Kenneth Myers Abstract This paper argues that metaphysical closure—the aspiration to produce a complete and final account of what exists and why—is impossible in principle. The argument proceeds by distinguishing two independent forms of uncertainty: ontic uncertainty, in which reality itself leaves certain propositions unsettled, and epistemic uncertainty, in which agents are structurally unable to know or justify certain truths. I show that each form of uncertainty independently undermines the possibility of a closed metaphysical system. When combined, they yield a general Impossibility Theorem of Metaphysical Closure. The result is not merely epistemological: it reveals something fundamental about the nature of existence itself. 1 Introduction The history of metaphysics is marked by recurring attempts to produce a complete, final, and closed account of reality. F...